Per una ontologia cognitiva pragmatista. Il contributo di G.H. Mead

Guido Baggio

Abstract


Nell’articolo si svolge un’analisi di alcuni elementi teoretici utili a impostare un percorso di integrazione delle differenti prospettive 4EA alla cognizione in un framework pragmatista. A tal riguardo, vengono prese a riferimento alcune teorie filosofiche e psicologiche di G. H. Mead. In particolare, la sua teoria della percezione in azione presenta degli elementi che possono contribuire a una integrazione delle differenti versioni dell’enattivismo, mentre la sua teoria comportamentale del significato si pone come punto di sintesi fra filogenesi e ontogenesi del linguaggio e della cognizione umani. La nozione meadiana di simpatia mostra inoltre alcune interessanti assonanze con la nozione di empatia utilizzata nelle neuroscienze odierne, ponendosi come punto di intersezione utile all’elaborazione di un’ipotesi esplicativa riguardo alla cognizione sociale.

 

The article discusses some theoretical elements to integrate the different perspectives on cognition within a pragmatist framework. In this regard, some philosophical and psychological theories of G. H. Mead are taken into account. In particular, his theory of perception in action presents elements that can integrate the different versions of enactivism. His behavioural theory of meaning stands as a point of synthesis between phylogeny and ontogeny of human language and cognition. His notion of sympathy is a useful conceptual tool for developing a working hypothesis about social cognition, revealing some interesting similarities with the notion of empathy used in neuroscience.

Parole chiave


4EA cognition; enattivismo; pragmatismo; ontologia cognitiva; George Herbert Mead; 4EA cognition; enactivism; pragmatism; cognitive ontology; George Herbert Mead

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.15162/1827-5133/1270

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